Roger Myerson - CERP

Roger Myerson

Research Fellow

Roger Myerson is a Research Fellow at CERP. He is the David L. Pearson Distinguished Service Professor of Global Conflict Studies in the Harris School of Public Policy and the Griffin Department of Economics at the University of Chicago. Dr Roger has made seminal contributions to the fields of economics and political science. In game theory, he introduced refinements of Nash’s equilibrium concept, and he developed techniques to characterize the effects of communication when individuals have different information. His analysis of incentive constraints in economic communication introduced some of the fundamental ideas in mechanism design theory, including the revelation principle and the revenue-equivalence theorem in auctions and bargaining. Dr Roger has also applied game-theoretic tools to political science, analysing how political incentives can be affected by different electoral systems and constitutional structures. Dr Roger has a PhD from Harvard University and taught for 25 years at the Kellogg School of Management at Northwestern University before coming to the University of Chicago in 2001. He is a member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and the National Academy of Sciences. In 2007, he was awarded the 2007 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences in recognition of his contributions to mechanism design theory.

Roger Myerson

Research Fellow

Roger Myerson is a Research Fellow at CERP. He is the David L. Pearson Distinguished Service Professor of Global Conflict Studies in the Harris School of Public Policy and the Griffin Department of Economics at the University of Chicago. Dr Roger has made seminal contributions to the fields of economics and political science. In game theory, he introduced refinements of Nash’s equilibrium concept, and he developed techniques to characterize the effects of communication when individuals have different information. His analysis of incentive constraints in economic communication introduced some of the fundamental ideas in mechanism design theory, including the revelation principle and the revenue-equivalence theorem in auctions and bargaining. Dr Roger has also applied game-theoretic tools to political science, analysing how political incentives can be affected by different electoral systems and constitutional structures. Dr Roger has a PhD from Harvard University and taught for 25 years at the Kellogg School of Management at Northwestern University before coming to the University of Chicago in 2001. He is a member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and the National Academy of Sciences. In 2007, he was awarded the 2007 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences in recognition of his contributions to mechanism design theory.

Roger Myerson

Research Fellow

Roger Myerson is a Research Fellow at CERP. He is the David L. Pearson Distinguished Service Professor of Global Conflict Studies in the Harris School of Public Policy and the Griffin Department of Economics at the University of Chicago. Dr Roger has made seminal contributions to the fields of economics and political science. In game theory, he introduced refinements of Nash’s equilibrium concept, and he developed techniques to characterize the effects of communication when individuals have different information. His analysis of incentive constraints in economic communication introduced some of the fundamental ideas in mechanism design theory, including the revelation principle and the revenue-equivalence theorem in auctions and bargaining. Dr Roger has also applied game-theoretic tools to political science, analysing how political incentives can be affected by different electoral systems and constitutional structures. Dr Roger has a PhD from Harvard University and taught for 25 years at the Kellogg School of Management at Northwestern University before coming to the University of Chicago in 2001. He is a member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and the National Academy of Sciences. In 2007, he was awarded the 2007 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences in recognition of his contributions to mechanism design theory.